Who Owns Elvis? Intellectual Property and the Rock Star for the Ages: CLE in Tennessee on "Elvis Law"

ELVIS LAW.

That's the billing.

Who owns Elvis?

Joe Edwards of the AP reports that Elvis is the topic of an East Tennessee Legal Aid continuing legal education seminar for attorneys.

Vladimir Putin Returning as President of Russia

The Economist has an article titled Russia's presidency: The return of the man who never left.

People may differ in their opinions on Putin, but there is no doubt that he is good for Russia, and that is his job, whether as President or Prime Minister. He represents Russia's interests in the same manner that the American President represents the interests of the United States.

There is, particularly in America and in the United Kingdom, an expectation that political leaders follow some kind of a democratic political "ideal", about which there is no common agreement or consent in the first place, so that measuring world leaders by that democratic political "ideal" is simply a waste of time.

In fact, when one views the current financial instabilities in the West, Russia -- viewed from the purely practical aspect -- appears as an unexpected pillar of economic, political and financial stability.

Moreover, Putin and current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev have been instrumental in establishing a Russian style of the rule of law in Russia. This rule of law can not be directly compared with Western systems but must always be examined in relation to the manner in which Russia has historically been ruled. By that standard, Russia has achieved considerable "rule of law" modernity in the recent era.

That problematical legal and political issues remain to be solved is clear, but which country in the world does not have them? That is always a part of the political scene in any nation.

Government Finance: German Chancellor Supported by Parliament Vote in Germany on Euro Bailout Mechanism

Read the article by Helen Pidd and David Gow in Brussels for The Guardian in Merkel enjoys triumph in bailout vote, but how long will it last?

Obviously, there is good reason to believe that it is going to last a lot longer than Eurosceptics in the U.K. would have us believe.

I do wish the major news agencies and newspapers would get away from their sensationalistic "the world will end soon" type of news reporting and report more sensibly about what is really happening.

People do not need constant "panic-making". Rather they need responsibly presented news of actual events.

Law Firm Websites: What is their Future? Robert Algeri at The National Law Journal

Robert Algeri has a premium access article at the National Law Journal on The future of the law firm website.

Hat tip to Marsha Redmon at LinkedIn Legal Marketing.

Press Release of the German Federal Constitutional Court: Constitutional complaints lodged against aid measures for Greece and against the euro rescue package unsuccessful – No violation of the Bundestag’s budget autonomy

There is a lot of misinformation out there about the financial situation in the European Union and in the (smaller) Eurozone so I thought I would repost this September 7, 2011 press release from the Press Office of the German Federal Constitutional Court relating to constitutional complaints expressed in Germany against bailout measures taken for Greece, complaints which the Court rejected as unfounded.

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Copyright © 2011 BVerfG

Federal Constitutional Court - Press office -

Press release no. 55/2011 of 7 September 2011 Judgment of 7 September 2011 2 BvR 987/10 2 BvR 1485/10 2 BvR 1099/10 Constitutional complaints lodged against aid measures for Greece and against the euro rescue package unsuccessful –  No violation of the Bundestag’s budget autonomy In today’s judgment, the Federal Constitutional Court has rejected as unfounded three constitutional complaints which are directed against German and European legal instruments and other measures in connection with the aid to Greece and with the euro rescue package. Press Release no. 37/2011 of 9 June 2011 informs about the facts of the case. It is available (in German) on the Federal Constitutional Court’s website. The Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court has decided that the Monetary Union Financial Stabilisation Act (Währungsunion-Finanzstabilisierungsgesetz), which grants the authorisation to provide aid to Greece, and the Act Concerning the Giving of Guarantees in the Framework of a European Stabilisation Mechanism (Gesetz zur Übernahme von Gewährleistungen im Rahmen eines europäischen Stabilisierungsmechanismus), hereinafter: Euro Stabilisation Mechanism Act (Euro-Stabilisierungsmechanismus-Gesetz), which relates to the euro rescue package, do not violate the right to elect the Bundestag under Article 38.1 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG). By adopting these Acts, the German Bundestag did not impair in a constitutionally impermissible manner its right to adopt the budget and control its implementation by the government or the budget autonomy of future Parliaments. However, § 1.4 of the Euro Stabilisation Mechanism Act is only compatible with the Basic Law if it is interpreted in conformity with the constitution. The provision is to be interpreted to the effect that the Federal Government is obliged to obtain prior approval by the Budget Committee before giving guarantees within the meaning of the Act. Furthermore, the Senate determines the boundaries under constitutional law for authorisations to give guarantees for the benefit of other states in the European monetary union. In essence, the judgment is based on the following considerations: I. Scope of review / admissibility The Senate regards the constitutional complaints which have been lodged as admissible only to the extent that the citizens, invoking their right to elect the Bundestag, which is protected by Article 38 GG, challenge a loss of substance of their power to rule, as it is organised in a constitutional state, by a far-reaching, or even comprehensive, transfer of duties and authorities of the Bundestag. Article 38.1 GG protects competences of the present or of a future Bundestag from being undermined, which would make the realisation of the citizens’ political will legally or practically impossible. In principle, there is a threat of the act of voting being devalued in such a way if authorisations to give guarantees are granted in order to implement obligations which the Federal Republic of Germany incurs under international agreements concluded in order to maintain the liquidity of currency union member states. The Senate was permitted to leave undecided under what preconditions constitutional complaints lodged against a supplementation of primary Union law by measures outside the Treaty structure may rely on Article 38.1 sentence 1 GG. In this respect, the complainants have not presented a concrete context which indicates a supplementation of primary Union law by measures outside the Treaty structure that is due to the impugned measures. Also with regard to a possible violation of the fundamental right to property (Article 14 GG), the complainants have not sufficiently presented facts from which it follows that the challenged measures might result in objectively impairing the euro’s purchasing power to a considerable extent. To the extent that the constitutional complaints impugn not only the two pertinent Acts of the German Bundestag, they are inadmissible because they lack a suitable object of complaint. II. Standard of review Article 38 GG demands, in connection with the tenets of the principle of democracy (Article 20.1 and 20.2, Article 79.3 GG), that the decision on revenue and expenditure of the public sector remain in the hand of the German Bundestag as a fundamental part of the ability of a constitutional state to democratically shape itself. As elected representatives of the people, the Members of Parliament must remain in control of fundamental budget policy decisions in a system of intergovernmental governance as well. When establishing mechanisms of considerable financial importance which can lead to incalculable burdens on the budget, the German Bundestag must therefore ensure that later on, mandatory approval by the Bundestag is always obtained again. In this context, the Bundestag, as the legislature, is also prohibited from establishing permanent mechanisms under the law of international agreements which result in an assumption of liability for other states’ voluntary decisions, especially if they have consequences whose impact is difficult to calculate. Every larger scale aid measure of the Federation taken in a spirit of solidarity and involving public expenditure at international or European Union level must be specifically approved by the Bundestag. Sufficient parliamentary influence must also be ensured with regard to the manner in which the funds that are made available are dealt with. The Senate, which, with a view to the procedural setting of the proceedings, was barred from reviewing the impugned Acts against provisions of Union law, nevertheless points out that the existing European Treaties are not contrary to an understanding of the national budget autonomy as an essential, inalienable competence of the directly democratically legitimised parliaments of the Member States but that they, on the contrary, require the existence of such competence. Strict observance of the European Treaties guarantees that the actions of the institutions of the European Union have a sufficient democratic legitimation in Germany and for Germany. In this context, the Senate also points out that the conception under the Treaty of the currency union as a stability-oriented community is the basis and the object of the German Act approving the Treaty, as the Senate has already made clear by its Maastricht ruling (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court (Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts – BVerfGE) 89, 155 <205>). III. Subsumption When establishing a prohibited relinquishment of budget autonomy, the Federal Constitutional Court cannot put itself in the place of the legislature with an expertise of its own. With regard to the extent of the assumption of guarantees, it has to restrict its review to evident transgressions of ultimate boundaries. In this context, the legislature has a margin of appreciation with regard to the probability of having to make payments in a guarantee event, which the Federal Constitutional Court has to respect. Something similar applies to the assessment of the future sustainability of the federal budget and of the economic performance of the Federal Republic of Germany. Taking this legislative priority of appreciation into account, and measured against the constitutional standards that have permissibly been applied, both the Monetary Union Financial Stabilisation Act and the Euro Stabilisation Mechanism Act prove to be compatible with the Basic Law. The Bundestag did not deplete its right to adopt the budget and control its implementation by the government and did not disregard the essential content of the principle of democracy. It cannot be established that the amount of the guarantees given exceeds the limit of budget capacity to such an extent that budget autonomy would virtually be rendered completely ineffective. The legislature’s assessment that the authorisations to give guarantees to the amount of a total of approximately EUR 170 billion are within the capacity of the federal budget does not transgress its margin of appreciation and is therefore constitutionally unobjectionable. The same applies to the legislature’s expectation that even in the case of the complete realisation of the guarantee risk it would still be possible to refinance the losses through revenue increases, cuts in expenditure and longer-term government bonds. At present, there is also no reason to assume an irreversible process with consequences for the German Bundestag’s budget autonomy. The German Act Approving the Treaty of Maastricht in the version of the Treaty of Lisbon still guarantees in a manner that is sufficiently definite under constitutional law that the Federal Republic of Germany is not subjecting itself to an incalculable automatism of a liability community which follows a course of its own that can no longer be steered. Neither of the two impugned Acts establishes or consolidates an automatism by which the Bundestag would relinquish its right to adopt the budget and control its implementation by the government. The Monetary Union Financial Stabilisation Act restricts the authorisation to give guarantees with regard to their amount, it indicates the objective of the guarantee, provides, to a certain extent, for the payment modalities and makes certain agreements with Greece the basis of the giving of guarantees. Thus, the content of the authorisation to give guarantees is defined to a large extent. The Euro Stabilisation Mechanism Act lays down not only the objective and the fundamental modalities but also the amount of possible guarantees. The giving of guarantees is only possible during a certain period of time, and it is made contingent on agreeing an economic-policy and finance-policy programme with the Member State affected. The programme requires mutual agreement of the euro currency area states, which secures a determining influence to the Federal Government. However, § 1.4 sentence 1 of this Act merely obliges the Federal Government to strive to reach an agreement with the Bundestag’s Budget Committee before giving guarantees. This is not sufficient. Instead, guaranteeing parliamentary budget autonomy requires an interpretation of this provision in conformity with the constitution to the effect that the Federal Government is in principle obliged to always obtain prior approval by the Budget Committee before giving guarantees. This press release is also available in the original german version.

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